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Legal Writing Scholarship, Making
Strange, and the Aesthetics of
Legal Rhetoric
by Jack L. Sammons*
INTRODUCTION

Some of the central issues addressed at the 2009 Mercer Law Review
Symposium "Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the
Legal Writing Institute" involved questions about the scholarship
potential of the discipline of legal writing. Those on the fringe of the
academy, as legal writing professors are now and as clinicians were in
the 1960s, often offer the clearest perspective on it, and in the case of
the legal academy, on the practice itself. What scholarship, I wondered
as I listened to the speakers, would best take advantage of this
privileged perspective and of legal writing's necessary focus on rhetoric?
There are at least two ways of approaching this question, both of which
I want to use here, and these two ways can be related one to the other
as I will try to do here as well. The first is to wonder what subjects for
the discipline are most naturally generated by teaching it. Here, I will
pursue this approach immodestly by trying to display how my own
recent scholarship could have naturally arisen (and to some extent it did
naturally arise) from teaching an Advanced Legal Writing section as
* Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law.
Duke University (B.A., 1967); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1974); Antioch
School of Law (M.A.T., 1978).
My great thanks to Linda Berger, Linda Edwards, David Ritchie, and Karen Sneddon
for their assistance on this comment in its original version, for their encouragement of my
involvement in their art, for many helpful conversations on these and many other subjects,
and most importantly, for their friendship. The original version of this comment was an
informal talk: Rhetoric's Making Strange, Law and Rhetoric Conference: Legal Writing
Through a Rhetorical Lens (Jan. 6, 2009). I deeply appreciated and learned much from the
comments received there.
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part of the Advanced Legal Writing Certificate Program at Mercer. The
second approach is normative: what subjects should legal writers
contribute to the academy and why? For the first I will ask you to join
me in an imagined internal monologue as I wonder about what to say to
my students in my Advanced Legal Writing section. For the second I
will offer an argument that what emerges from this internal monologue,
and I believe, would also emerge from the similar internal monologues
of other legal writing professors, can offer a central perspective for legal
writing scholarship, a perspective that could define it. It is a perspective
much needed, I will argue very briefly in conclusion, by both the legal
academy and the practice. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to
say: desperately so.
I.
Imagine, if you will, a classroom setting in which I am a legal
writing professor waiting to comment on a student's draft fact statement
for an appellate brief in a negligence case involving a slip and fall at a
restaurant one rainy evening in San Diego. I have not read this draft
fact statement before nor have any of my students other than its author.
We started this classroom exercise by taking ten minutes or so to permit
everyone to read it for the first time. As I wait, I listen to five students
offer their suggestions for improving the statement before it is my turn
to comment. What, I wonder, is going to be left for me to say about it?
How can I connect what is left for me to say with what has been said
before by the students? If I can make connections, does a theme emerge
from these that we, as a class, can explore further in the little time that
remains for such? And, if a theme does emerge, what should I say about
it?
You are, of course, being asked to imagine improvisational teaching
within an advanced legal writing course. Because it is so improvisational, this teaching for me always includes an internal monologue-Hannah
Arendt's "two-in-one,"' really-in which I very quickly try out potential
themes for the class.
Now, before I plunge you into an exaggerated version of this stream
of conscious thinking (and stream of conscience for they go hand-in-hand
in such a setting) let me tell you a little more about it. Typically in such
a setting I am far more focused on rhetoric than I normally am; not just
on thinking about rhetoric, but also on thinking rhetorically, that is,
thinking within a world that is, more obviously than most, rhetorically
created. Because I am, rhetoric's ability to unsettle my ordinary

1.

See HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 185 (1978).
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perceptions-which is what I am most interested in here-is very strong.
In fact, in this setting, rhetoric's ability (an ability I think I am willing
to defend as unique) to make everything seem strange is strong enough
to turn upon rhetoric itself and to reveal anew those rhetorical insights
that are now almost hidden from us because they have been implicit in
Western culture for centuries. It is also strong enough to generate utter
nonsense. In addition, however, to restating the obvious-sometimes
useful, sometimes not-and producing nonsense, rhetoric's ability to
make the world, including its own world, seem strange will often yield
insights (most often in the form of good questions) that are interesting
and, occasionally, potentially important for law students, lawyers, and
others as well. This is what we are after here: a demonstration of how
subjects for scholarship can emerge from such teaching. (And, in the
footnotes, I have brazenly cited to my own work to make the connections
for you to at least one example of how this might work.)
In what follows, however, I honestly have no clear idea which
rhetorical insights (and which potential articles these insights might
have generated) are which-which are restatements of the obvious,
which are nonsense, and which are interesting and worth pursuing
further. Just like in the improvisational classroom, I have not yet
thought through many of these with any care because doing so is not the
point.
To cabin this experiment a little further, imagine that I have already
determined that what is left for me to say, when the fifth student
finishes her comments, is to suggest that additional details should be
added to the fact statement's description of the defendant, our client,
who owned the restaurant where the accident occurred, and to do so in
a way that would connect him more closely with the restaurant. This
was, let's imagine, my initial, rather mundane, editorial (and rhetorical)
instinct.
So what follows is an exaggerated internal monologue about this one
simple editing suggestion.
Please remember that this is not an
exposition. There is not a single theme here; it is instead a struggle to
find one. Some thoughts will lead nowhere and some will surely
contradict others.
II.

Okay, I think what I'll say to them then is this old
standby: We need to make him seem more human. And
then perhaps I should suggest describing his style of
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management as personal, as motivated by his desire to
pass the restaurant along to his children as his father had
done before him. Something along these lines. His
statement and his testimony were so very detailed,
suspiciously so. Perhaps, however, that detail can be our
excuse for going on a bit about him and a way of keeping
this fact statement from being too obviously manipulative.

But wait, I can't just say we need to make him seem
more human. That's likely to mean different things to
different students. What does it mean? More importantly,
how does it work to persuade? These would be fair
questions to be asked here. Seeing him as human, even if
we agreed on what that meant, could evoke many things,
couldn't it? It could even be negative-familiarity breeds
contempt-or it could be just a value conferred by his
being seen as a member of the same species rather than
his being seen as some other abstraction. Here, however,
I think to see him as more human would mean to see him
as vulnerable in some sense. Surely this is a large part of
its persuasiveness. Vulnerable to others to be sure, but
not just that. Also-well-ontologically vulnerable in some
sense; maybe only ontologically vulnerable.
I wonder if this vulnerability is related to Joe
Vining's idea of the inherent transcendence in our use of
the word "person" in the law?2 There's a certain unspoken
vulnerability in that at its essence, isn't there? A vulnerability in the idea of something beyond what we are giving
value to us, perhaps the idea of our being created. But if
this is like that, then we are not making him seem "more
human" at all if by "more human" we mean seeing a
shared humanity in some form. We would instead be
personalizing him more radically. I should say it this way
to the students because it captures much better the idea
that the persuasive value of making him more human

2. See Joseph Vining, Donald A Giannella Memorial Lecture: The Mystery of the
Individualin ModernLaw, 52 VILL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2007); see also JOSEPH VINING, FROM
NEWTON'S SLEEP ch. TV (1995). For a very recent and very interesting discussion of the

role of "person" in Vining's work, see Steven D. Smith, PersonsAll The Way Up, 55 VILL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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arises from uniqueness; each of us is the last one of a
species and we need to be careful with each other-something along these lines. What is more important
in this then is not what we share but what we do not
share. This isn't what I expected, but perhaps it is why
we are persuaded by the details of a life. Okay, good
enough for now, and maybe if this is right, there's some
guidance in it for selecting the details we should add here,
at least for this context, and we can unpack this guidance
later.
But, if this is right, what about an expression like
"real person" as in "the author treated the people she was
describing in the article as 'real people.'" Surely this
means "in all their complexity" and that could mean
nothing more than "like us" in this way. Yes, but it is not
just the fact of our shared complexities, right? It is,
instead, that in our complexities we become different,
become unique. So maybe this is the same. Maybe there
isn't a tension there. I'm not sure.
Wait a minute! I think I'm saying that a judge
would likely care about the defendant's uniqueness
because it displays his vulnerability. The more we make
this defendant a "person" by increasing the details of our
description of him, the more the judge may come to care
about him in his vulnerability. What I need to say here is
that we can be more persuasive in representing individuals
by insisting that each person ...

and, therefore, each

issue?... each person is unique, irreplaceable, ultimately
unique, and each is then ...

well.., mysterious in this

way. I wonder if this is true for all representations of
individuals? I wonder if what we attempt to do in some
fashion is to speak their mysteriousness?
But what does this do for us as a legal argument?
Uniqueness, especially the implied uniqueness of each
issue, doesn't really provide the judge with any real
resource for decision-making. In fact, it works in the
opposite direction. It takes resources away. If the
"person" is unique, then placing him or her in categories
for fairness, for equal treatment, for rule applications, and
so forth, is suspect. And yet a lot of our legal arguments
work exactly this way, don't they? They take resources
away and push the judge, at least ideally perhaps, towards
resources that are themselves, well, non-linguistic, non-

929
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cognitive3 perceptions, and ...

uh oh ... mysterious
again.4 Can this possibly be right? It does seem that
good competing arguments on any good legal issue point in
this odd direction: to a basis for judgment that is beyond
the arguments themselves.
Okay there's something to this, but I'm going too far
afield. I need to think about this in terms of the particular
language of the law first. Whatever "person" evokes, I
think the class would agree that the thought of him we
would be trying to encourage here is much more than just
a more detailed mental image. It has got to work harder
than that as rhetoric. The meaning of the words we'll add
then, whatever those words might turn out to be, can't be
thought of as just associational. They are not just ideational either, for the thought we want to encourage, if the
thought of a real "person" is to work as I've described it,
must remain fully connected to the physical and material
while invoking a value, mysterious or not, beyond these.
These seem the right criteria.
So it is back to Joe Vming again.5 If he is right
about the law making the word "person" express a transcendence, it is surely an imminent transcendence. It
arises from the empirical, as Joe would say.' Okay, this
sounds about right to me and gives me a way of imagining
what we are doing here. Is there a simple way, true to
their own experiences, to say this to the class?
Maybe we should add something about the client's
family. I could point them to Linda Berger's good discussion of underlying metaphors of family, but she was
thinking of a specific context in which the issue was

3. By "non-cognitive" I mean not reducible to empirically based factual knowledge. I
do not mean emotivism. The closest analogy to my use of the term here would be to
intuitions that, while grounded in experience, cannot be captured within the totality of the
various factors that produced them. This is not to say that we are currently unable to
capture them, but that they cannot be so captured. There is in this an obviously close
connection to phronesis.
4. For my view of the way in which the processes of opposing legal arguments move the
judge towards reliance upon what I have called here the "mysterious," see Jack L.
Sammons, Justice as Play, 61 MERCER L. REV. 517 (2010).
5. See Vining, The Mystery of the Individual in Modern Law, supra note 2, at 12-13.
6. For a discussion of Joseph Vining's resort to the empirical in this context, see Jack
L. Sammons, The Law's Melody, 55 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).

20101

LEGAL WRITING SCHOLARSHIP
family.7 What are the metaphors that best capture a
vulnerability turning upon our uniqueness? Family, in
fact, does the opposite in some ways because family tends
to stand as a buttress against vulnerability. And yet
describing a person's family is the paradigm trope of
making them into "real people" so I can't end up in a
position calling into question this ordinary usage. Can I?
But then being family could mean being more
vulnerable in a sense, for the vulnerability would then
extend to those in the relationship. I am more vulnerable
in certain ways if I am family, for the risk of personal
harm to me is then extended to others who are also me.
"I and I," as they say in Jamaica.' And maybe family is
also a reminder to the judge of a group who cares ultimately about the vulnerability of the particular person because
of his uniqueness. It is more than a "reminding"; it is an
appeal to mimic their thinking in the judge's. We should
use descriptions of family, then, if we use them at all, that
serve rhetorically to remind the judge that others see the
client as unique.
I'm getting far afield here and none of this is going
to be useful without thinking about it much more carefully. I wonder, though, if I am on to something broader
here? Is it possible that the mysteriousness of "person" is
the smallest element involving all the various fundamental
forces of persuasiveness? The quark of persuasiveness? Is
it just possible that other elements-all elements: not just
pathos, but ethos and logos as well-are persuasive in their
relationship to this quark, however distant this relation-

7. See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge StructuresAffect JudicialDecision
Making: An Analysis of Metaphor,Narrative,and Imaginationin Child Custody Disputes,
18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259 (2009).

8. The expression "I and r is a Rastafarian way of saying "we" that makes clearer than
any other English expression that what we think of as an "r is itself communal. For
Rastafarians, in addition, any self, including communal ones, is defined in its relationship
to-indeed, its identity with-a divine. As Rastafari scholar E. E. Cashmore described it:
"I and I is an expression to totalise the concept of oneness ...the oneness of two persons.
So God is within all of us and we're one people in fact.... The bond of Ras Tafari is the
bond of God, of man." ERNEST CASHMORE, RASTAMAN: THE RASTAFARIAN MOVEMENT IN
ENGLAND 67 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The term, I am told, is often used
in place of "you and r among Rastafari, and especially in Rastarfarian inspired reggae
music. See Tom McArthur, Rasta Talk, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 846 (Tom McArthur ed., 1992).
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ship may seem to us at times, especially in regards to
logos? I wonder if I can take each of the suggestions the
students have made thus far and display how they are
ultimately connected to this sense of person in some
fashion? This is too much for now, and I'm running out of
time, but I should try this later.
* **

Would it help if I thought about this more linguistically? Because we want to create a real person, perhaps
we should think of words with "per" as a shared morpheme.9 We could see if we can't work the words "personal," "perspective," "perceived," and so forth, into the fact
statement without being too silly about it. I wonder if the
shared morpheme carries over to "persuade." Is "persuade"
a silent context for the word "person"? Or, perhaps more
likely, the other way around? Is it part of the adaptive
unconsciousness of the meaning of each of these terms?
And, especially because it is more opaque than other
shared morphemes, does it better facilitate both uses?
(Perhaps I need to try to connect this with the idea of
person as the basic element of persuasion and trace the
etymology of the words. And I should connect it to the
mysteriousness of each person, which also means that in
persuasion, each of us retains an ultimate authority to say
no to any offered argument.' ° )
The students would likely think of this as foolishness, but if the morpheme does work this way, that is, as
an unconscious shaping of meaning, then by definition we
shouldn't just trust our conscious perceptions. It should
seem foolish if it is true. But I need a simple and obvious
example of this before I introduce it to them. The most I
should do now, I think, is just note generally that other
unspoken similar words are part of the context in which
words take on meaning, and note the shared morpheme

9. See Introduction to VICToR TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO THEATRE 17-18 (1982). And,

although I am fairly certain that she does not agree with my use of it here, I owe special
thanks to my daughter-in-law and linguist, Clara Shirley-Appel, for a helpful discussion
of this morpheme.
10. See Jack L. Sammons, A Rhetorician's View of Religious Speech in Civic Argument,
32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 367, 367 (2008).
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casually. Later, I'll find the right poem to use to make
this point and to give them the tools to find it in other
legal text.
Okay, if we are going to make this a real "person"
when should this "person" appear in the fact statement?
There is surely a hint of causality simply by putting events
in a sequence. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. And, it is not
just the logical fallacy at work, for if all there is of causation, as is sometimes said, is that one event routinely
follows another, then the ordering is the argument of
causation. No, this is stretching. But does it work this
way rhetorically? If so, I should certainly not introduce
the defendant before, but after, the event he is said to
have caused. I'm not sure this will fit here, however, for
readers' expectations may be opposed to this ordering, but
I think it is worth mentioning. They will start thinking in
terms of shaping the context in which the meaning of the
words arise.
In any case, it seems pretty clear that the form of
the expression here must reflect and participate in the
content expressed just as, for example, in music. What
then is the form in this context that best expresses the
appeal of "person?" It should be something that works like
vibrato does for vocalists, making the song more moving
because the singer seems more involved and more vulnerable.
Yes, this sounds right, and the form of the expression that could work won't do so by any magic, I should
say, but because we lawyers have appropriated for our own
proper use modes of presentation produced by artistic
practices or, and better, other artistic practices-the
vibrato connection is a good one. Those forms of expression that we are likely to deem most persuasive are so
because they were made so by other artistic practices. Yes,
I like that, and they will too. There's a romanticism to it,
of course, in making more explicit the artistic nature of
their work. It's possible to go too far with this and have
one practice corrupting another, etc., etc., but I'm tired of
thinking about practices for now.11 (I wonder what I'd be

11. See, e.g., Jack L. Sammons, Cheater!": The Central Moral Admonition of Legal
Ethics, Games, Lusory Attitudes, Internal Perspectives,and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 273
(2003).
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like if I'd never read Aristotle? It's almost like asking
what I'd be like if I'd never been married or had children.
I'm no longer capable of knowing this. How very strange to
be situated so strongly by someone so ancient.)
Even so, I must tell them that we can't forget in all
this that we want our fact statement to appear to be
submissive to a legal (and moral) narrative form-a
required form-and not as creating one. And the question
for us is how are we to be submissive to this authority of
form while being creative in the ways I'll describe? Other
artists, I might say, describe themselves this way all the
time. 12 The muse speaks. But here the muse is the
appearance of a certain legal requirement, a legal reality
if you will, that controls us in this context. Perhaps all
muses can be thought of in this way. So the judge is
looking to see to whom the legal muse has spoken most
clearly. What an odd way of thinking of this, but true to
experience and true to our expressions of it. I wonder if I
can connect it to the mysteriousness stuff? I am so glad
I've been teaching long enough for the students to accept
this from me.
Even so, ifI suggest something too unexpected here,
some cleverness that will seem out of place to them
initially, knowing, as I do, that it is possible to be poetic
within this language once you have embraced it as your
own, could I get them to understand the way in which this
cleverness might be considered "right" and "fitting" in the
language's own terms? If I introduce the poetic use of this
language prior to the students' embrace of the language
and of its own terms, I will have changed what it is they
embrace and, if I am wrong, done harm. But then staying
true to the language's own terms in a narrow way is the
definition of bad art.'3
This is all too Bloomsbury'ish. But it is beginning
to sound like there is a particular aesthetic of legal
persuasiveness. And it is not an aesthetic grounded in
beauty so much as it is a fittingness or, perhaps better

12. For a discussion of the role of necessity in artistic creation, see ROWAN WILLIAMS,
GRACE AND NECESSITY: REFLECTIONS ON ART AND LovE (2005). For my own use of this

idea in regards to the law, see Sammons, The Law's Melody, supra note 6.
13.

See, e.g., Quentin Bell, BadArt, in CHANGING PERSPECTIVES INMORAL PHILOSOPHY

160, 161, 163 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983).
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said, the beauty of a certain fittingness. Can we go
further to say that this is a legal aesthetic? That lawyers
live in an aesthetic polity of their own making?. And, if so,
that they are as close to poets as previous generations
thought they were? 4 I wonder if thinking of a legal
aesthetic is a way of connecting all the students' comments? I'm pretty sure I could pull this off here and it
might be good, too. Is there a legal aesthetic community
to which we all now belong? Can I say that this is what
the course is about? I think it is, but it is an odd aesthetic
going back to "person." We are the poets through whom,
when we are virtuous in our work, other people speak, and
law is revealed. Is this saying too much?
Got to get back now to my particular suggestion for
the editing.

Of course, we want to appear not to be persuading
at all but offering something for discovery. If this is right,
then we really are arguing to a judge who we assume is
thinking of persuasion in Aristotle's terms of an identification between speaker and audience that occurs within the
conversation rather than as a result of it or as the recognition of a prior shared identity." This is an experienced
judge at home with the possibility of being surprised by
what the argument requires of him or her. (And thus
receptive to the arguments towards uniqueness.) Perhaps
this understanding of persuasion, encouraged by the forms
of arguments like this one, does remain an ideal of
judging, even among the current crop of judges and
justices. But haven't I been thinking, at least in regards
to the persuasiveness of "person" of something akin to pathos-although that's not right, for the persuasion of
"person" involves all of who we are. Sharp distinctions
between pathos and logos are surely just wrong. This
aside, however, what does pathos mean in a context in
which the authoritative decisionmaker is said to be living

14.

See KATHY EDEN, POETIC AND LEGAL FICTION IN THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION

(1986).
15. See Jack L. Sammons, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation to Write Well (2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336542 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
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up to the ideals of his or her role, an ideal, that is, that is
outside of him or her in this sense and disembodied in a
way that pathos cannot be? Is the ideal disembodied? It
can't be; it arises within a practice rooted in the person.
To what within this role does "person" appeal? Why
should we call such a thing, when it does persuade,
we trust this persuasion in this
justice? Why should
16
extraordinary way?

I wonder if it is a mistake to focus, as we teachers
of rhetoric do, upon persuasion, which implies that others
must be convinced of something before they will assent to
it. I wonder if perhaps people are instead quite naturally
inclined not only towards seeking assent, agreement, an
identity of speaker and listener, of writer and reader, but
naturally inclined to give these. We don't have to be
convinced, in other words, at least not initially. This isn't
something that popular culture or popular legal culture
would accept, but there are good arguments for it, aren't
there? Think, for example, of how we are in social settings. We disagree or distance ourselves from some
thought some person offers quite reluctantly, and we often
do so in a manner that minimizes our differences as much
as we possibly can. This is a matter of manners to be
sure, but shouldn't we take manners seriously as indicators of what we are like?
Why do we do this? If we are naturally inclined
towards agreement, why? Do we do so because each of us
looks to the other for confirmation of our individualized
constructions of reality? We want to know that we have
the world right and the only way we can do this is through
others agreeing with us, even if only a few? In agreement,
then, we have our sanity-which is to say our identity-confirmed; we learn what being human requires and
what it means to be a good one. These are ongoing human
enterprises in which we are mutually dependent and our
inclination to assent reflects that they are.

16.

See Sammons, Justice as Play, supra note 4.
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Perhaps then the arguments we teach as teachers
of legal rhetoric are not so much about convincing people
-including judges and jurors-but about attempts to avoid
disruptions of this natural inclination or to encourage
them on the other side. Does this make any difference?
There seems to be a different ontology at work in it and it
is one very much at odds with the way we usually view our
differences.
There's a connection here! We make our narratives
more persuasive by increasing the sense of the decisionmaker's living through them. And living through them
tragically because we don't offer the most persuasive, but
the most persuasive in light of the competing narrative.
I wonder if the fact that there are always competing
narratives moves us away from extreme forms of argument? Surely concerns with the persuasiveness of character reduces aggression in the argument. This, too, seems so
contrary to public perception, but surely it's true.
Perhaps narrative is too pale a word to describe this
theatrical nature of persuasion. Perhaps we should say
cinematic. To encourage the judge and jury to "live
through" the experience is to encourage them, like an
audience of tragic theater or a good film, to treat the
experience as an aesthetic. To let it affect them in the
moment as they would with music-a different sense of
time, a certain form of patience, a willingness to let
something happen to you as a way of knowing, and so
forth. This seems a reflection (and maybe a confirmation)
of what I might call a theatrical or performative justification for trusting legal judgments, especially in comparison
with the political.' 7 We trust the judgments of jurors and
judges, I could say, because they have lived the issue
through the trial and arguments or reflected upon its
performance. It is not that they have thought more
carefully about it in the usual sense-far from it! But that
they have thought about it in this way. It is like trusting
intuitions that arise from experience; trusting practical

17.

Id.

937
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wisdom as opposed to knowledge; 8 trusting poetry as
opposed to prose. And such is the role of our audience
here.
So, the law is an aesthetic judgment upon competing, tragic, cinematic narratives. And because it is, it
draws upon all of what we are and of who we are at its
best. Ironically, given the lay understanding, we trust this
judgment, even in comparison with the political, because
it is more human than other judgments are and yet, oddly
again, it is so within structured roles as it must be. I
should say this to them at some point and I should connect
this with the mystery of judgment as its justification for
being trusted. This sense of justice is so frighteningly
fragile and contingent. No one is going to like this
understanding of law other than those who have made
their peace with our fragility and our finitude.

But why then are we most typically content with
just two competing stories and deem this sufficient for
determination of what justice requires? We can't say the
story is true but only that it is better than the other story.
Of course, dividing up the world this literary way reminds
us that justice is not so much about the story being true
but about the participation of disputants in a meaningful
way in the resolution of their disputes. And yet the
legitimacy of the law depends upon a determination of who
"we" are when this "we" is much broader and more
encompassing than the disputants. How peculiar. And, of
course, we place the advantage of the multiplicity of stories
on one side of the dispute or the other in the form of
burdens of proof and persuasion. There is always someone
who wins if the world is determined to be more complex
than the performance allows; there is always a default
story in this sense.
Even with this, however, we almost always see
these disputes as agonistic rituals, as battles of competing
stories offered to define us like the sacred games of the

18. For a wonderful analysis of practical wisdom for our time, see generally JOSEPH
DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND: 'PHRONEsIS' AND 'rECHNE' IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY
AND IN ARISTOTLE 91, 92 (1993).
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Greeks. 9 What of our differences? Are we, even in our
most serious disputes, as sharply divided as it may appear
at the beginning of a dispute, and what does legal rhetoric
do to these divisions? Milbank says that we are created
such that our differences are ultimately harmonious-not
eliminated in harmony but required by it and always
ongoing." I wonder how legal rhetoric would look if we
started from this ontological assumption or thought of this
as emerging as a truth? Each story, in other words, being
seen as required by the other for understanding the
fullness of who we are. It's like the Brazilian expression:
God made us all of different races because it is so very
sexy. Perhaps rhetoric doesn't demand the skeptical
critique, but refutes it. But if so, it has to avoid the
politics of Sophocles' or Eurypides' tragic accounts of
rhetoric and that's hard to do, especially for someone like
me, because they are so appealing in a Holmesian way.
Perhaps, though, the rhetorical ideals of the legal conversation can offer something like this, if it rests upon
mystery in the way I've been thinking of that here or-I
think it was Steiner who put it this way and I should
check this-if we can "look out of [the] language [of law]
not into darkness but light."2
Even though the law must choose within its
agonistic rhetorical game, doesn't the legal conversation
reveal the way in which opposing arguments need one
another? And this choice only makes sense within the play
of argument, as words make sense only in the play of
signification.
Are unanimous opinions always
wrong-always a sign of some stupidity, some narrowness,
some exclusion of a voice or voices, or some other lack on
the part of the Court? Shouldn't we applaud 5-4s as being
more likely to be right in the sense of judgment, as I am
thinking of it here, as reflecting who we are? We are
entitled to be suspicious of each unanimous opinion, for
each likely masks questions that should be asked if we are
to know ourselves through the resolution of the dispute.

19.

Sammons, Justice as Play, supra note 4.

20. See generally JOHN MILBANK, THE FUTURE OF LovE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
THEOLOGY 340,341(2009); JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY & SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR
REASON 429, 430 (1994).
21. GEORGE STEINER, A READER 292 (1984).
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Let me see where I am. What did the students
suggest and what reasons did they give? Their typical
reasons are sometimes disappointing: conciseness and
clarity, as if those were not in tension and as if some
combination of the two were always most persuasive. I
wonder what the language is in which conciseness and
clarity are always virtues? One in which the thoughts of
one mind are transferred like bricks to another rather
than one in which thoughts are created in the speaking of
them. The implicit language of these critiques then may
always be a technical one. What if I suggested that they
try their hands at writing legal haikus or legal parables?
Got to speak soon, but now I'm not at all sure how
to present my one suggestion. The more I tell them I'm
not sure, however, the more reliable my judgments seem
to be. They don't want to accept that I really don't know.
The effect is so strong that Socrates' "I know that I don't
know" was surely a rhetorical move intended to create a
more persuasive character for himself. I wonder why this
collapsing of rhetoric and dialectic is so seldom mentioned,
especially because the authorities condemned him as a
rhetorician?

To the class: "I have only one additional suggestion here. We need to
personalize the defendant more than we have done so far and do so in
a way that connects him as a real and vulnerable person to the
restaurant. But before offering specifics let's see if we can unpack the
image of the audience we are addressing implicit in all our suggestions
so far: Who is this reader? How does this person read? In what
contexts, including in what role or roles? For what purposes? And with
what ideals? And, knowing these, what are the means of persuasion
available to us in this case? So let's start very generally using what you
have offered so far and then see if we can work our way towards the
specifics of how best to personalize him."
III.
In these jumbled thoughts, you heard the way in which thinking
rhetorically, as prompted by teaching an advanced legal writing class,
makes things strange for me and the ways in which I try to make
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something of its doing so. For others it would be quite different, of
course. Once something is seen as strange, I immediately try to connect
its rhetorical strangeness with things I have thought about before, as I
did here, in an attempt to make sense out of it. The connections others
would make would be dramatically different (and surely less jumbled).
But, despite this difference, I do not think that what I have thought here
is unique to me in teaching legal writing. Far from it. For every
thought here, the good ones (if any there are), the useless ones, and the
bad, are held together not by a single theme, or a single pedagogy, and
certainly not by a politics or a social policy, but by a perspective-an
aesthetic one.
Our central challenge as law professors and lawyers was laid out for
us by Aristotle as he sought to justify rhetoric as something other than
a knack in service to selfish interests through the degrading manipulation of power. He did so by arguing that rhetoric was an art: the art of
revealing the means of persuasion available within each, typically tragic,
case, and for this, requiring a (civilizing) agon.2 2 But, I fear, as
professors and as lawyers we have lost sight of our own art and no
longer have the attitude towards the materials out of which it is created
that any art (and any true interpretation of text, following Gadamer23 )
requires.' I do not wish here to identify culprits-those whose attitude
towards law is instrumental and is so only in service to their own
preconceived teleologies-and only wish to note that of all the professors
within the academy, it is professors of legal writing who, by the nature
of their work, are least prone to such fouling of our own nest. This is
true because legal writing professors, like good lawyers, are those among
us most required not to care which side of the argument is being made;
they are those among us most likely to respect a legal text sufficiently
to consider it as something that may be able to speak compellingly in a
particular situation; they are those among us most likely to see that a
text, because they do not have a telos in mind, can be new and different
in each situation; they are those among us most likely to ask only what
would persuade an idealized judge rather than what should; and because
of all this, they are those among us most attuned to the morality of the

22.

See generally ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CMic DISCOURSE 12-13

(George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
23.

See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 321-36 (Joel Weinsheimer &

Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad Publ'g Corp. 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1960).
24.

The fact that the enormous number of articles offering to legislators what is

essentially advice that will go entirely unnoticed and certainly unheeded in most cases is
treated with more academic respect than articles on the art of persuasion is, I think, proof
enough of the point made in the text. This is not to say that there is not a role within the
academy for both; it is to say that the former should be the byproduct of the latter.
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argument-all of which is required if legal rhetoric is to be an art and
justified in Aristotle's terms. And all of which describes an aesthetic
attitude towards the law that permits the play of justice.25
This perspective is, I believe, a way of defining legal writing professors
as legal educators and a way of giving a coherency to what it means to
be professors of legal writing. But, truth to tell, I think there is more to
it than this. For there is a potential in rhetoric, and in the lives of
rhetoricians, for a much deeper appreciation of the meaning of the lives
of lawyers and of judges, for an understanding of those lives as lived in
a polity other than the political ones, for seeing in this otherness a
gadfly on the steed of the state, for an alternative to the use of force, for
an aesthetic appreciation of not just law, but our lives, that is not
nihilistic, but transcendent, and for an understanding of our ontology in
which our eternal differences are understood as gift. In other words, I
think this is a noble cause for the discipline of legal writing. But then
perhaps this is just rhetoric.

25. I use "aesthetic" here to describe not a disengagement from reality as in an
.aesthetic distance" but as a particular form of engagement. There is a demanding
morality to this engagement including the requirement of the humility upon which so much
of any morality depends.

